According to American experts, Putin made this grave mistake in the war in Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine did not go according to plan from the start: the operation was supposed to last only a few days, but the major attack on Kiev last spring failed, mainly because Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin apparently underestimated the Ukrainian resistance.

According to the American think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Russian president has made another serious mistake: to date, Putin has not appointed a competent person to the crucial post of commander-in-chief for the war in Ukraine. Instead, he constantly rotated the commander-in-chief for operations in Ukraine, as he had not appointed one at the start of the invasion.

With dramatic consequences: Putin’s refusal to appoint a commander-in-chief led to the formation of factions in the Russian army, “disorganized command structures and unfulfilled expectations,” the ISW writes in an analysis. The Kremlin boss presented himself as the “mastermind” of a successful invasion of Ukraine and wanted to prevent the Russian public from attributing the expected victory not to him, but to a possibly popular commander.

Putin, himself with no significant military experience, feared an internal rival “who could surpass him,” according to the ISW – drawing a comparison to the power struggle between Joseph Stalin and Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov during World War II : Stalin had limited war experience and was reportedly jealous of Zhukov’s military achievements and fame.

The problem has been going on for the entire course of the war since February 2022, the ISW said in its analysis. At the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, the position of Supreme Commander of Ukraine remained vacant: the Russian leadership initially believed that the neighboring country would be overrun within a few days; A commander-in-chief overseeing all military operations in Ukraine was apparently not considered necessary, the ISW writes.

Only in April, when the Russian army lost the Battle of Kiev and moved its troops to the Donbass, did Putin appoint for the first time a commander-in-chief for all military operations in Ukraine: army general Vladimirovich Dvornikov, who also commanded the southern part of Russia . military district.

But Dvornikov was not in Putin’s favor for long: when he failed to capture all of Donbass on the important “Victory Day” on May 9, Putin put a new one in his place: Gennady Shidko, who was also the commander was promoted from the Russian Eastern Military District.

According to the ISW, the intention was that the Ukrainian commanders also commanded Russian military districts: the responsibility for an additional, less senior position was to put the commander-in-chief on an equal footing with the other commanders of the Russian military districts. and thus avoid an overly prominent role.

Only eight months after the war broke out, Putin appointed a commander-in-chief for the war in Ukraine, who had no further responsibilities, and only after several major setbacks, the ISW said.

Further personnel changes followed at the top of the Russian military leadership, which always made the Kremlin chief dependent on the current military situation: after the partial successes in the battles of attrition for Lysychansk and Sievjerodonetsk in the Donbass, Russian generals who had been promoted until then did not belong to the inner circle of power. It was also the time when the mercenary militia Wagner and their boss, Yevgeny Prigozhin, were making a name for themselves.

The ISW writes that even the closest allies were not spared when the president became frustrated with the conduct of the war. After the embarrassing Russian defeat in the Kharkiv region in September 2022, when Ukrainian forces overran Russian positions like a blitzkrieg, Kremlin chief Putin raised his confidence in his chief of staff Valery Gerasimov: In October, Putin installed Sergei Surovikin as the new commander-in-chief. chief, who joined the forces criticizing Gerasimov, belongs to the army and is said to be close to Wagner boss Prigoschin.

But it was also the end of January for Surovikin: having, like his predecessors, failed to bring the military successes he had hoped for, he had to leave his post. Since then, Valeri Gerasimov has not only been chief of staff of the Russian army – and therefore number two in the Kremlin army after Defense Minister Shoigu – but also the commander-in-chief of all operations in Ukraine.

According to the ISW, Putin cannot afford to dismantle the loyal Gerasimov, even though the Russian winter offensive has had little success and Bakhmut, for example, has still not been captured. The Kremlin despot blamed himself in part for the mistakes in the war in Ukraine, the ISW analysis concludes:

His “preference for personnel changes” is “indicative of his domestic political leadership style”, which aims to keep internal rivals from becoming too powerful and to play them off against each other. However, this style of politics is not suitable “to lead an army that is in a costly war”.

However, the ISW assumes that Putin will stay on track: the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive and the question of how the Russian army fares will decide which commanders are promoted or fired next.

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(t-online, dm)