“In Ukraine, Putin adopts Stalin’s military strategy” The oil company ExxonMobile, as a researcher of the climate crisis, knew – and remained silent

Western countries promised Ukraine some light and heavy tanks: Bradley, Marder, AMX 10, Challenger, Leopard 2. Are these tanks suitable for the frozen ground in Ukraine?
Alexandre Vautravers: With the exception of the light wheeled French tank AMX 10, all other tanks are tracked and can be used not only on frozen, but also on loose, i.e. soft ground. The heaviest of these tanks, namely the Challenger and Leopard 2, weigh 65-70 tons and 56-60 tons respectively.

Is a very high weight in winter conditions not a disadvantage?
no The weight of the tanks is distributed over the entire surface of the track. As a result, the specific ground pressure is very low even with the heaviest tanks. It is comparable to the weight of a human being. Therefore, the use of tracked tanks is suitable for frozen or snow-covered ground. For this, so-called “snow crampons” must be mounted in advance. For example, the Leopard 2, a tank I know well, can drive on a terrain with 1.20 m of snow or wade a river with the same water depth.

“This is disinformation”

Some netizens point out that the bridges in Ukraine built under Soviet rule are not designed for the heaviest tanks. How does it look?
This is misinformation because the infrastructure is designed to withstand multiple 40 ton trucks. So they can withstand two to three times the maximum allowed weight in peacetime. The smooth passage of a tracked tank without changing direction in wartime is not a problem. The Swiss army and other armies (Spain, Sweden, Finland) have for a long time used older generation bridge-laying tanks, weighing only 40 tons, without issues.

What about the effectiveness of wheeled armor?
They may be lighter, between 15 and 30 tons, but the pressure is distributed over only 6 or 8 wheels, so they sink in the snow as well as in muddy ground. Chains must also be mounted off-road.

For which floor is the AMX 10 suitable?
It is designed for road driving. The main advantage of a wheeled armored vehicle is that it can travel at high speeds, up to more than 80 km/h, which is faster than tracked vehicles. Another advantage is fuel consumption. Wheeled tanks can travel hundreds of miles without needing to be refueled. However, once they encounter obstacles such as grenades or debris, they must drive at walking pace like an all-terrain vehicle, which severely limits their uses. They are unable to turn in place and negotiate obstacles or steep inclines. Its use is therefore very limited in urban areas.

“Ukraine has changed its strategic concept”

If all these tanks are delivered to Ukraine, can they make a difference on the ground?
It depends on how they are used. Two cases are conceivable. The first case relates to how the Ukrainians used artillery systems received from the West in the summer of 2022. By that time they were under such pressure that they had to immediately send this artillery to the front. This means that this modern and powerful material was distributed in small quantities at the front. If you do this again, you win tactical bets that make the difference on certain points. However, this is not what Ukraine is currently striving for.

what does she want
Since August, Ukraine has switched to a different strategic concept, namely the formation of battalions or brigades from homogeneous material. As an example, I mention 30 Slovenian main battle tanks that were delivered to Ukraine. These tanks are grouped together at the same location, assembled with crews from the same unit, and trained before being sent to the front lines. By adding German, British and French tanks now, following the same logic, one can expect greater successes than Ukraine achieved last summer in creating a mass effect. If only because Russia does not currently have equivalent capabilities against Challenger and Leopard 2 tanks.

«The volume of fire from Russian artillery has decreased»

However, Western tanks will expose themselves to Russian artillery…
Both Russian and Ukrainian artillery have been feared so far. It is estimated that more than 60% of battle tank losses on both sides since the start of the conflict have been caused by artillery. Only the volume of fire of the Russian artillery and their observation power are not as high today as they were six months ago or at the beginning of the conflict.

“Like Zhukov and Konev in 1945 for Berlin”

How do you see the front developing, especially in the east around Bakhmut and Soledar, where the fighting is heaviest? What are the Russian and Ukrainian tactics in this regard?
On the Russian side, there is an internal competition between different armed groups to achieve tactical success. This ensures that the various Russian units fight against the enemy as well as among themselves. This is a difficult situation for the Russians, which has its models: during World War II, Stalin introduced a competition between his generals and marshals. He did so during the Battle of Berlin in 1945, when he asked Zhukov to come from the right and Konev to come from the left, with instructions that the best should win. Today, on the Russian side, we again see this form of competition between military leaders and units or even private military companies – certainly resulting in medals, promotions and rewards.

Can this work?
In practice, the current Russian involvement is associated with a very high loss of life. There may be successes on the Russian side, but then it’s about exploiting them. It’s not enough to take a city, you have to have enough men the next day to hold it and fight on. Within a few days, the Ukrainian counter-offensives managed to recapture areas that the Russian army took weeks to complete in the spring of 2022.

«A race between Ukrainians and Russians»

Recently, there has been talk of a “major offensive” on the Russian side. Is this to be expected?
In reality, various offensives are being prepared. It was assumed that the winter would be relatively calm, but since October both sides in the conflict have been gathering forces to launch one or even two offensives over the course of the winter. You should think of it as a race where whoever goes on the offensive first can expect to gain the most territory. Russian reinforcements were brought to the Lughansk region, mainly to compensate for heavy losses there. Another possibility would be an offensive from Belarus, but the Belarusians would have to allow it and then follow Russian logistics, which is anything but certain – such as the spring 2022 troubles and troop standstills have shown for Kiev.

Is a Ukrainian offensive to be expected?
There are certainly one or two in the pipeline: in Zaporijjia and perhaps towards the Crimean peninsula. These are major offensives that can shake up the situation in Russia.