Their six biggest mistakes and how they learned from them: This is how the Russians turned the tide in Ukraine

The mistakes

Underestimated Ukraine – It is the biggest mistake the Russians have made. In the years since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainians have massively rearmed and trained personnel. Moreover, NATO prepared them for a possible invasion.

Euphemistic information – Information from the front to the Kremlin flowed poorly. After the invasion, intelligence touted alleged progress in the field, leading to incorrect orders from the highest levels.

Chaotic attacks – Thinking they were the stronger, unprotected tank columns, they drove into Ukrainian ambushes. There was a lack of coordination, even within individual troops. For the first two months there was not even a unified high command.

Burnt Out Beginners – The Kremlin sent many beginners to the front, some of whom had no military training. Improper manipulations led many to death, for example, when a hand grenade accidentally detonated in a soldier’s dormitory in Belgorod.

False security – For a long time the Russians thought they were safe on their side of the front line. With the modern Himars, the Ukrainians were able to carry out successful attacks, for example on ammunition depots. There were often many deaths because soldiers were placed at the depots so they could use cell phones.

Poor fleet protection – For a long time, the Russian Navy was only concerned with attacking southern Ukraine from the Black Sea. They neglected the defense of the fleet. The Ukrainians managed to sink ships using missiles and drone boats and severely damage the Kerch Bridge.

The Russians are coming in en masse

In the two years of war that the Russians launched, they felt the toughness and cleverness of the motivated Ukrainian troops. But the attackers have learned. Mauro Mantovani, 60, a strategist at the ETH Military Academy, said: “The Russian army has regained the initiative because it brings more people and equipment to the battlefield and is willing to accept more losses.” The case of the eastern Ukrainian city of Avdiivka is symbolic of this.

Russia can recruit and train significantly more personnel and now has four times more troops in Ukraine than during the invasion, when there were around 150,000 soldiers. The Russian arms industry is also in full swing.

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This initiative and the deliveries of drones from Iran and artillery ammunition from North Korea allowed Moscow to expand its arsenal and strengthen the combat zones. Mantovani: “When it comes to artillery ammunition, the Russians are five to ten times superior to the Ukrainians, which compensates for the lower hit rate.”

Better tactics

The benefits for Russia also have to do with tactical and technical adaptation, Mantovani says. At the beginning of the war, the Russian army relied heavily on tactical battalion groups and special forces and, in places, on the Wagner mercenaries, who were centrally led using ‘commando tactics’. Today, however, the dominant battle on urban terrain was waged by smaller company units, which enjoyed greater freedom with ‘contract tactics’.

As a defensive tactic, reinforcements along the front line in southern Ukraine have proven successful, Mantovani says. “This allowed the Russians to thwart the Ukrainian summer offensive last year.” In addition, the protection of vehicles and electronic systems has been improved, as has the ability to jam Ukrainian communications and, for example, combat Ukrainian drones.

Infiltrate Europe

But the Russians are also adapting their strategy outside the combat area. The recruitment, training and support apparatus is being expanded to better infiltrate European countries. This is what the British Royal United Services Institute writes. Other measures include aggressive partnerships with African countries and the instrumentalization of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, 47, to expand influence over Muslims in Europe and the Middle East.

“After two years of war, Russia has gained the upper hand in Ukraine,” says Mauro Mantovani. In addition to the Russian adjustments, this also has to do with declining support from the West and the wear and tear on the attacked Ukrainians. The strategy expert predicts: “If US support dries up, Russian territorial gains can be expected in the third year of the war, well beyond the occupied four provinces.”