These are the main weaknesses of the Ukrainian army – and their strengths Mysterious object in Australia probably rocket engine

The Ukrainian counter-offensive has now been going on for more than a month. The successes so far have been modest, at least if one judges offensive efforts by territorial gains. In the weeks since June 4, Kyiv’s soldiers have recaptured about 253 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory.

That is about as much as Vladimir Putin’s army managed to capture in the neighboring country in the past six months. What sounds like a lot seems disappointing compared to the rapid reconquests Ukraine achieved during its surprise offensive in September 2022 (about 3,000 square kilometers in just six days).

Especially since they command a high price in blood. Dozens of soldiers die every day trying to break through the Russian defenses by Ukraine.

Some Western military experts are already talking about the failure of the offensive. Ukraine itself has also repeatedly indicated that the fight against the Russian occupiers is proceeding slowly and sluggishly.

So is the campaign a failure? No, says Mark Milley. The US chief of staff stressed to the Pentagon on Tuesday that the Ukrainian counter-offensive was anything but a failure.

“I think there’s still a lot to fight for and I stand by what we said before: it’s going to be long, it’s going to be tough, it’s going to be bloody,” said Milley.

Milley called the heavily fortified Russian defenses in the occupied territories the biggest obstacle to the Ukrainians’ attempts to break through. “The losses suffered by the Ukrainians in this offensive are due not so much to the strength of the Russian air force as to minefields,” he said.

The problem of minefields has now been adequately described by military experts. In the first months of the year, Russia had plenty of time to expand defense systems in the occupied territories.

On many parts of the approximately 1,000 kilometer long front, the Ukrainian troops are now encountering three rows of fortifications, consisting of anti-tank ditches, trenches and concrete structures. There are often extensive minefields in front of them. Already there, many Ukrainian attacks come to a halt.

The Ukrainian High Command is under enormous pressure

Russian troops have dozens of different types of mines scattered across the terrain. Even for demining experts, these are difficult to detect and eliminate. This slows down the Ukrainian advance considerably. Success is sometimes only measured in meters and no longer in kilometers.

Meanwhile, the army command in Kiev has changed their tactics: instead of attacking the Russian positions with mechanized formations and tanks – without adequate artillery and anti-aircraft protection – and suffering heavy losses in men and material, smaller infantry shock squads are now making their way step by step, row by row of trees, through the minefields. This is exactly what US General Milley predicted: a long, bloody battle.

And this battle threatens to become even bloodier, because sooner or later Kiev will have to achieve success, also because the West expects progress in the liberation struggle of the Ukrainians, despite all unconditional declarations of solidarity.

Moreover, years of attrition war would not be reasonable for the Ukrainian people themselves, nor for arms-supplying partners in the West. The Ukrainian high command is therefore under enormous pressure.

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reaffirmed that Ukraine’s allies will not give up their support: “Our work continues and we will do everything we can to ensure that the Ukrainians can be successful.”

But anything that is not a success threatens to become a problem. Because the Russian ruler Vladimir Putin is playing time. That’s exactly what he’s counting on: the wear and tear of Ukraine’s attacking troops and the waning patience of the West.

“Your advances are not really coordinated”

All the more worrying should be the analysis of some well-known security experts who have been on the ground in recent weeks to get a feel for Ukraine’s military strategy.

According to this, Ukraine not only lacks sufficient ammunition or heavy Western equipment, as experts and the Ukrainian government emphasize time and time again. There are also apparently numerous military-tactical shortfalls.

“Ukrainian armed forces are still not in full control of larger-scale combined arms combat,” writes Franz-Stefan Gady.

This is a tactical-operational deployment concept used in the NATO armies. Roughly simplified, this means that the various elements of the armed forces work together in a coordinated manner with their respective troops and vehicle types (e.g. armored troops and infantry). The core of the doctrine is the interplay of fire and movement, that is, in particular, the coordination of ground forces and air forces, which is intended to ensure the fire protection of the land forces.

Gady is a policy advisor and analyst at the Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. He was in Ukraine with Rob Lee, a former naval officer and political analyst at the US think tank Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), US military analyst and Russia expert Michael Kofman, and Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense expert.

In the war zone and in Kiev, they spoke with brigade commanders, officers, intelligence officials and defense politicians. On Twitter, the group of experts describes their impressions as a preliminary analysis.

According to this, the US-supplied cluster munitions could certainly give the Ukrainian counter-offensive an advantage, but the military-tactical problems remained the main obstacle to decisive breakthroughs of the Russian lines.

For example, the current state of the offensive could only change if the Ukrainian command took a “more systematic approach” to military tactics. Or morale on the Russian side is falling sharply, writes Gady.

The core of the expert group: “The story that the counter-offensive is progressing so slowly because too few weapons are being delivered is monocausal and is not supported by the frontline fighters.” In other words, the story often spread by Ukrainian sources is not true.

Gloomy outlook for Ukraine’s offensive effort

Even Gady’s experts don’t believe a sudden collapse of Russian forces is likely. “I suspect it will continue to be a bloody war of attrition, with reserve units gradually being thrown out over the coming weeks and months,” Gady writes. The outlook for Ukraine’s efforts is bleak.

Especially since many analysts note the increased adaptability of the Russian military. In recent months, according to the report, Putin’s forces have become much more attuned to the precision strikes of the Ukrainian Himars and have significantly improved their electronic warfare capabilities.

In this way they can better repel the hugely important attacks in depth, ie attacks on the areas behind the front. In this context, Gady also speaks of “effective countermeasures” by the Russians, although their artillery arsenals were becoming increasingly empty.

Initiation of a change of mindset in the Ukrainian army

On the other hand, the Ukrainian army under the overall command of General Valeri Saluschnyj has also impressively demonstrated its adaptability in recent months. It has managed to hold its own against superior military power, integrate previously incompatible and largely unknown weapon systems, and adopt NATO tactics in rapid succession. Their morale and willingness to fight remains high.

But something else may matter: how fast the mindset change in the Ukrainian military is progressing. “The main thing I’m trying to change is the culture,” Zalushnyi said in a video released by Ukraine’s defense ministry. He wanted to move away from blind obedience to orders and instead wanted to hear the individual soldiers and their opinions.

“I don’t believe in crushing people, I don’t oppress them, I don’t humiliate them,” he said in a recent interview with the Washington Post. As a result, the Ukrainian army is now fundamentally different from the Russian army, which is essentially still a Soviet army, says Zalushny.

During their visits to the front in Ukraine, Gady and his colleagues met some critical soldiers. “The soldiers we spoke to were all too aware that inadequate tactics, lack of coordination, bureaucratic hurdles and Soviet paradigms hinder the progress of the offensive.”

Sources