Ruthless and skillful: Russia’s “General Armageddon” prepares for the counterattack “Squid Game” at your fingertips: “Wednesday” sets a new Netflix record

After the recapture of Kherson, hopes for further Ukrainian victories have risen almost immeasurably. Masterful Ukrainian war propaganda, particularly on social media, has contributed much to this euphoria in the West.

However, the current fierce fighting around Bakhmut shows that nothing would be more disastrous than the premature write-off of Russian military might. Where the Russian forces are concentrated, they can not only hold their own against the Ukrainians, but also gain ground themselves.

Shortly after the Russian attack on Ukraine in late February and the first major setbacks at Kiev, military historian and director of the German Tank Museum Ralf Raths warned that history has shown time and again how flexible and adaptable Russian armies could be after initial catastrophic defeats.

Raths alluded, among other things, to the 1939 Winter War against Finland, where the Soviet Union turned the course of the war in its favor in the spring of 1940 after the initially devastating “Motti Pocket Battles” and forced Finland to cede vast territory.

Masterful retreat across the Dnieper

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the Russian army has completed its withdrawal from Kherson across the Dnieper River without the horrendous casualties of men and equipment predicted in what would have been the most difficult military operation of all. This drop operation apparently went so orderly that immediately afterwards rumors spread that Russia must have made a secret deal with Ukraine to evacuate Kherson.

There shouldn’t be any truth in that. From a Russian perspective, the appointment of army general Sergei Surovikin as commander-in-chief appears to be paying off. Notorious for his brutality, the 56-year-old career officer has made Kherson an almost uninhabitable zone with constant artillery fire on the advancing Ukrainians and is using the elite units withdrawn from there further north into the Dombass for counter-attacks.

Previously, “General Armageddon,” as Surovikin’s unflattering nickname goes, gave Russia a strategic advantage with waves of mass missile and drone bombings of civilian infrastructure. Continuous terrorist attacks against the civilian population had already made Surovikin his trademark during his time as commander in Syria.

In Ukraine he continues this strategy with even greater ferocity. Only two days after his appointment by Putin, Surovikin ordered the first major swarms of missiles to be fired at the Ukrainian metropolitan areas.

Banned, more is expected this week from these waves in Kiev, tying up major resources of Ukraine’s air defense, air force and reconnaissance. “While the Ukrainians are victorious on the battlefield, they cannot strike back against the Russians on a strategic level,” notes US military analyst Lawrence Freedman.

Another military expert, Australian ex-Major General Mick Ryan, predicts that the Russian mobilization of additional recruits and equipment, which is taking place in the shadow of the strategic missile offensive, will enable Surovikin to conduct massive offensive operations in the spring of 2023. With this goal in mind, adjustments are also taking place at a lower tactical level, which can undoubtedly be traced back to the influence of Surovikin.

Adapted tactics of the Russian infantry

British intelligence is currently claiming that Russia is moving away from its previously valid basic concept of using tactical battalion groups (BTG). As the Ministry of Defense in London wrote in its daily Ukraine report on Tuesday, “the relatively small allocation of infantry to the BTG often proved inadequate”.

In addition, according to this operational doctrine, the artillery was over-deployed, negating the Russian advantage in quantity with this crucial weapon.

With his characteristic ruthlessness, Western military circles trust Army General Surovikin to put Russia back on the winning track with the well-known massive deployment of infantry waves after massive artillery preparation. Neither their own losses, least of all Ukrainian losses, would deter Surovikin once Russian arsenals were sufficiently replenished.

Under these circumstances, it is advisable for Ukraine not to underestimate Surovikin’s leadership skills, despite all the brutality, ex-General Ryan clarifies. According to Ryan, the Ukrainians’ future military success will depend heavily on how well they understand Surovikin and outwit his tactics. At the same time, the West must not give up its arms shipments and must finally deliver main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers to Ukraine. (aargauerzeitung.ch)