The three biggest open questions after Prigozhin’s coup attempt A quarter of a million people at the Pride parade in Mexico City

24 hours ago, it seemed that civil war was about to break out in Russia, a country with 6,000 nuclear warheads. 25,000 armed Wagner mercenaries headed for Moscow in a convoy. En route, they destroyed at least six Russian army attack helicopters, killing their occupants. When Vladimir Putin threatened the mutineers with dire consequences, all signs pointed to bloodshed. But then the turning point. Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko announced a compromise between Putin and Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin. Soon after, Prigozhin ordered his mercenaries to retreat to the camp.

Many experts rubbed their eyes in bewilderment. The opaque power apparatus in the Kremlin suddenly appeared in a new light. And that raises questions.

How firmly is Vladimir Putin still in the saddle?

“Never before has Putin’s weakness been so exposed as during the attempted coup in Prigozhin,” analyzes Russia expert Luzia Tschirky of SRF. The Russian ruler shows a whole new face: “He, who has always wanted to present himself with determination and ruthlessness, seems completely overwhelmed by the uprising and cornered. Not only did Putin’s words lose credibility, his security apparatus also seemed weaker than ever .”

Tschirky’s analysis is consistent with expert consensus. The facade of Putin as a strong regent has collapsed. In doing so, he loses a cornerstone of his power protection device, writes Brian Whitmore of Texas Arlington University on the Atlanticcouncil.org platform: “Political change in Russia is only possible if three factors are present:”

“If fear is removed from the equation, the regime is in danger,” argues Whitmore.

How does Putin react to the shame?

Vladimir Putin will do everything to restore the climate of fear. Brian Whitmore is convinced of this: “Prigozhin will pay a high price for his rebellion.” William Weschler, former US Deputy Secretary for Special Operations and Counterterrorism, also sees it this way: “Prigozhin should stay away from windows on the upper floors. Putin’s opponents have been particularly clumsy there in recent years.”

Weschler does not believe that the Lukashenko compromise is the end of the story: “It is rather the beginning. Some things are constant in this changing world. One is that only a relatively small number of people make all the important decisions in Russia. Each of them has a lot of money, a lot of guns, or both. At certain points in history, these elites compete with each other to determine who is at the top. This results in one person being in charge, some dying and the others standing in line. Recent events should be understood as the last episode in this centuries-long history.”

In addition to Prigozhin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov have also been named as possible pawn victims. Both were at the center of Prigozhin’s criticism and have not been seen since the coup attempt. They could have been part of the Lukashenko deal.

It has been speculated for a few weeks that the relationship between friends Putin and Shoigu, who also spent the summer holidays together, has noticeably cooled.

Steven Kotkin of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford points out a very different danger in an interview with “Foreign Affairs”: “Putin could also do something radical to distract and gain the upper hand. He blew the Kachowka- Damn it. What about the nuclear power plant in Zaporizhia? Putin could blow it up and irradiate Ukraine.”

Can Ukraine take advantage of the confusion?

So far, the Russian armed forces have not collapsed. In the night from Sunday to Sunday, Kiev was again hit by missiles and the Ukrainian armed forces encountered fierce resistance in their offensives in the south and east. Nevertheless, the Guardian analyzes that recent events give Ukraine an advantage: “It is impossible to predict the further consequences, but the uprising, even if short-lived, should benefit Ukraine.” The reason is that the focus of the military leadership was, at least temporarily, on domestic events.

Doug Klain disagrees. He is an analyst at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center: “Ultimately, this uprising was about a disagreement over how best to continue Russia’s unprovoked war of annihilation against Ukraine. It is likely that significant concessions were made to the head of the Wagner group, or that Wagner’s role in the war effort was greatly increased. Should Wagner return to the front lines soon, Kiev may not experience the total chaos it hoped for after a victory on the battlefield.”

To what extent the uprising will affect the morale of the Russian soldiers cannot be predicted at this time. There are videos of regular Russian units declaring their solidarity with the Wagner troops during the coup. However, it is unclear whether they will return to the battlefield in Ukraine. Prigozhin is in exile in Belarus and the mercenaries who did not participate in the uprising receive an offer to join the Russian army. This means there is a chance that the infamous mercenary group will be disbanded.