Sport as a pawn in the East-West conflict

On December 25, 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. The goal: to end the civil war there and secure the fragile power of the local communists. A large majority of the international community called for the withdrawal of the Soviet Union three weeks after the invasion. The Soviet Union found support only in the socialist sister states of the Eastern Bloc.

Following the Cold War logic of not immediately and ‘violently intervening’, the Western bloc, led by the US, supported the insurgent Mujahideen in Afghanistan with money and weapons. Because these were Secret Service operations, official and publicly communicated countermeasures were limited to civilian areas. U.S. President Jimmy Carter cut back on already promised wheat supplies to the Soviet Union, stopped the export of high-end oil production technology, and called on the U.S. National Olympic Committee (USOC) to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.

In addition, the president called on friendly states, especially the athletically important Western Europeans, to follow the American example. Although many American Olympians publicly opposed the request, the USOC complied with the presidential call by a two-thirds majority; also because Carter threatened to cut state funding for sports if a US delegation competed in Moscow. In political Western Europe, on the other hand, the situation was much more complex.

In Switzerland, the sports associations had little to fear from political and public pressure: the Federal Council declared that sport in Switzerland is not a state affair and that the associations themselves had to decide whether or not to participate. In addition, boycotts should be rejected because they violate the Swiss policy of neutrality. In a March 1980 poll, 60 percent of Swiss respondents opposed a boycott, but if key Western European countries had not taken part, 55 percent would have been against participation.

In view of the anti-communism and anti-Sovietism that were dominant at the time in large parts of the Swiss bourgeoisie (and still partly in the Social Democrats), these were rather astonishing statements, because the dominant bourgeois bloc in parliament spoke in favor of of a boycott, while the left parties were against it.

The SVP press service made comparisons with the games exploited for propaganda purposes by the Nazis in 1936 and concluded: «[…] After the gossip in Afghanistan, the Russians should not be allowed to put on a propaganda show in Moscow. That would be a mockery of the high sporting and people-uniting ideals of the Olympic Games.”

A spokesperson for the SP told the Berner Bund that experience has shown that “a boycott is not a policy and certainly not a peace policy. [sei]. Peace policy must be designed in such a way that it enables others to undo ‘mistakes’ without losing face. But that is exactly what is not possible with a boycott of the Games in Moscow because of Afghanistan.”

It was very easy for the bourgeois parties to call for a boycott, because any Soviet countermeasures would hardly have hurt: trade with the Soviet Union represented only one to two percent of Swiss foreign trade.

The Swiss sports associations were also divided: the head of the then sports umbrella organization, the Swiss National Association for Sports (SLS), was in favor of a boycott. At that time, however, the Swiss Olympic Committee (SOC) decided to broadcast to the Olympics. The General Assembly decided by a very small majority (24 to 22 votes) not to boycott the games in Moscow. However, the individual trade associations must decide for themselves whether they want to compete or not.

In particular, the proponents of the boycott complained that the Soviet Union had ignored the fundamental principles of the Olympic charter by invading Afghanistan and that the Games were devalued from a sporting point of view due to the absence of many countries, especially the US. On the other hand, the opponents of the boycott argued that the sport that unites peoples and strives for peace must do without.

Of the sixteen federations with Olympic sports, only four ultimately did not want to make the trip to Moscow: the gymnastics, fencing, equestrian and shooting sports federations. Sports history research suspects their boycott because of the more dominant civil and military traditions within these associations, which manifested themselves during the Cold War in a strong rejection of everything that came ‘from Moscow’. However, this thesis needs further investigation.

The contrasting reactions in politics and sport show that Switzerland’s self-image as a haven of neutrality was not a law of nature, even during the bloc confrontation of the Cold War. Being neutral does not mean being rigidly between two blocs, but rather taking a geopolitical stance based on the opinion of the majority: are you neutral because you are going to Moscow despite the US call for a boycott? Or is this being used to legitimize the Soviet invasion? A matter of political attitude.

Historically, being neutral only works as long as other countries respect it. Related to the boycott campaign of 1980: With their ‘neutral’ positioning, the actors in Switzerland also looked at the decisions of the other governments and National Olympic Committees (NOC), especially those of friendly Western Europe. While the Federal Council confidently pushed for neutrality, individual sports leagues waited.

The vote in the SOC took place before the decisions in the NOK of West Germany, Italy and France, but the final decision would not be taken until after these votes. When three sporting heavyweights, Britain, France and Italy, announced they would compete in Moscow despite intense political pressure, the undecided Swiss federations agreed to participate. With the exception of Norway, Monaco and Liechtenstein, all ‘smaller’ Western European countries also took part.

The only major Western European country to boycott the 1980 Games was West Germany. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the Bundestag ‘recommended’ a boycott of the local NOK by a large majority and by all parties – in a legally non-binding vote. This allowed the members to vote on it a little later, with a vote of 59 to 40 deciding not to run.

Nevertheless, Chancellor Schmidt traveled to the Soviet Union in 1980 for a state visit. Economic ties between the two countries also remained unaffected; butter, wheat and machinery were still traded.

In Britain, the government and parliament (both dominated by Conservatives) did push for economic sanctions and a boycott. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, like her American counterpart, threatened sports federations with financial cuts if they competed. However, the British NOK was strictly against a boycott and received the support of the majority of public opinion, which criticized the political pressure on the sport. In the end, only the sailing, land hockey and equestrian associations boycotted the games in Moscow of their own accord.

In France, on the other hand, the government and NOK were on the same page and voted against a boycott, only the equestrian association decided not to participate. The French government also refrained from economic sanctions, because it did not want to jeopardize the détente policy that had been in place since the 1970s and which promoted rapprochement between the Western and Eastern blocs.

What conclusions about the (non) functioning of sports boycotts can be drawn from the historical observation of the half-baked Olympic boycott of 1980 for western democratic countries such as Switzerland?

Sports boycotts are usually initiated by political actors (governments, NGOs, parties), in rarer cases by sport itself (ie by sports associations or individual athletes). In both cases, the boycotts are not for sport-specific reasons, but for political reasons.

The political players are therefore usually at the forefront of the boycott debate, while sport usually just reacts: it takes the justified position that sport itself has nothing to do with politics, but at the same time claims that this is the reason to be completely apolitical – an ideal that clashes sharply with reality, because not taking a position on a boycott is also a political statement.

Moreover, from a historical perspective, sport moves in a triangle of M: masses (in the sense of spectator interest and corresponding media interest), markets (that is, economic interests), and power (in the sense of social and political interests or influence). Sport is thus politically influenced, but could certainly operate more independently of politics: in order not to be completely questioned politically, like the American NOK 1980, it itself should appear more political – for example, by consistently boycotting states that are at war and so on more credibly adheres to self-imposed values.

There is definitely room for improvement, as evidenced, for example, by the IOC’s current relations with Russia. As long as this does not happen, however, there will only be symbolic politics: for example, the associations refrain from propagating their national flags and anthems (Moscow, Italy, France, Great Britain and Switzerland, among others, did this), while political calling players for sports boycotts when the opportunity arises. While these are ‘cheap’ compared to other possible sanctions, they largely convey the political message due to the high level of spectator interest in sports.