Putin’s war machine is hitting a critical component

You can find them not only in rollerblades, washing machines and refrigerators, but also in cars, planes and tanks: without ball bearings, the modern world would literally come to a standstill.

Ironically, this universal part of every industry in Russia could become scarce and the Kremlin’s war production, experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Where is the (Russian) problem?

Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia imported more than half of all ball bearings. In 2020 it was 55 percent, most of which came from Germany for 17 percent – from car supplier Schaeffler to be precise.

According to the CSIS report, Russia imported the remaining 38 percent from other European countries and from North America. However, after February 2022, the Western suppliers would have withdrawn from the Russian market.

The CSIS writes:

The production and repair of trains is also affected by the shortage – particularly painful for the Russian economy, which is heavily dependent on rail.

“Russia could replace Western ball bearings with imports from, say, China or Malaysia and keep its wartime economy going,” it says. “But those ball bearings are very likely to be of inferior quality and less reliable.”

What else is Russia missing?

The CSIS also sees major supply problems for Russia with other components important to the war effort. For example, the Kremlin’s tank fleet is likely to lose quality as the country can no longer obtain optical systems important for targeting in modern tanks.

The situation is similar with microchips, which not only Russia can produce, but which are essential for modern weapon systems. The Kremlin has apparently been trying to solve the microchip problem for some time using unconventional methods.

According to the CSIS, the situation with engines, engine parts and machine tools is no less problematic: even before the war in Ukraine, Russia was heavily dependent on Western imports in these areas; Claims that Russia is now independent of Western know-how in manufacturing technology are implausible.

The economic experts of the CSIS estimate that Russia can produce about 20 main battle tanks per month under these conditions. However, this rate is offset by losses of at least 148 tanks per month in Ukraine, according to the report, citing figures from the Oryx project; this lists only those losses documented with photographs. The actual losses of Putin’s troops are likely to be significantly higher.

Sources

(t-online/dsc)