How does China export secrecy?

China thrives on secrecy. Focus of government in Beijingwhich is based on vigilance and control, not on openness and thoughtfulness of needs secrecy. And to maintain it, the Chinese government bans independent journalism, censors digital information, and closely monitors the kind of information democracies freely publish.

This commitment to secrecy and censorship is a long-standing feature of the Chinese Communist Party government. But with the current president, Xi Jinping, whose ideas on governance could shape the world for years to come, the party has become even more insidious. In recent months, the Chinese government covered up the deaths of up to a million people after ending its zero-covid policy. He manipulated and withheld information about the pandemic. And it has expanded its counterintelligence laws to exert even greater control over China’s information environment.

Beijing has also become a secret exporter secrecy abroad, something that was more intensely seen in China’s manipulation of the World Health Organization. Chinese authorities banned internal discussion of the outbreak in Wuhan and refused to share information with global health authorities, hampering the WHO’s response and forcing millions outside China’s borders to pay a heavy price. Later, Beijing tried to manipulate the results of the WHO research on the origin of covid-19. More than three years after the start of the pandemic, Chinese authorities continue to refuse requests from the WHO for data that could provide any clues about the source of the virus.

But international organizations are not the only ones affected by Beijing’s obsession with secrecy. As China projects its political, economic and technological power through major infrastructure contracts, educational or media partnerships and agreements to supply surveillance technologies, Beijing’s stealth model is expanding beyond its borders. Signatory countries agreements with China they find they should follow suit, limiting transparency and accountability, just as China’s leaders are doing at home. The result of this pattern of engagement is the gradual erosion of global norms of transparency and open government, and consequently the emergence of other new forms of cover-up and opacity.

When Chinese government bodies do business with a foreign government or company, they often ask that details be kept secret. Safe city project Mauricio, under which Chinese tech giant Huawei partnered with Mauritius Telecom and the Mauritius Police to install intrusive surveillance systems, including 4,000 cameras with facial recognition and license plate recording capabilities, is a case in point. The agreement had little public debate. Despite the hefty price tag of $500 million, financed by an Export-Import Bank of China loan, the initiative was casually announced in the National Assembly of Mauritius. When citizens raised questions about this, the Government justified itself with confidentiality clauses signed with the Mauritius Police, Mauritius Telecom and Huawei.

Something similar happened in Serbian, where the Government signed a contract with Huawei to install a comprehensive surveillance system of 8,100 cameras. Citizens were told that this would improve their security and that the technology could not be misused. However, as in Mauritius, there was no significant public debate and little was said about the deal. When such systems are imposed on an uninformed public, governments have unlimited possibilities for surveillance and control.

The risk of authoritarian norms

Given the speed of adoption of advanced digital platforms, there is a risk of their establishment applicable supervision rules is increasing. In many countries, authorities are reluctant to disclose information about the contracts through which they purchase surveillance technologies. As a result, it can be extremely difficult for non-state actors to discern who is behind these initiatives. The clarity of this is further complicated by the overlap between the government and Chinese companies. In this environment, China’s penchant for secrecy could rub off on other countries, especially those with weak institutions.

Resistance to transparency is spreading. IN Latin America, the Chinese government uses confidential debt agreements, which prohibit the signatory from publicly disclosing its terms. These deals, which are usually made quickly and in secret, often leave society on the sidelines. For example, loan agreements between Chinese banks and the Ecuadorian government only came to light after the 2016 Panama Papers.

A threat to open and accountable governance

The open societies they must respond to these challenges by rewarding transparency and reaffirming the principles and practices of openness. Secrecy is a competitive advantage for China, whose leadership has perfected secrecy-based governance at home and is unaffected by anti-bribery laws abroad. However, democracies have their own competitive advantage: openness. They should use it to expose the practices of Beijing and its proxies, including confidentiality clauses signed into agreements. Democratic countries should also sharpen the difference between their approach to government and China’s by strengthening their transparency efforts.

Democratic governments and NGOs must also do a better job of explaining the problems caused by Beijing’s secretive and often corrupt actions.

Open societies will have to develop the necessary structures and instruments to meet the challenges posed by the Chinese side. When negotiating with other countries, Beijing usually wins because it is the strongest. To solve it, you have to coalition for negotiations with China from a stronger position.

Beijing’s drive to export secrecy is an underappreciated dimension of its power projection abroad. Regime of world secret which comes out of China represents a systemic threat for open and accountable governance, and will require a decisive and lasting response from democracies to expose and neutralize it.

Christopher Walker is vice president of the National Endowment for Democracy. © 2023 Foreign Affairs. Distributed by Tribune Content agency.