Interview with military expert: “It will be difficult, very difficult for Ukraine” Child killed in Russian attack on Dnipro – the nightly update without photos

Mr. Heisbourg, does the announced offensive of the Ukrainians begin with “shaping”, the preparation of the terrain by artillery and other operations?

One thing is certain: the Ukrainians are behaving as if they want to launch a major offensive. Sabotage of railway lines, attacks on fuel depots, partisan operations such as those in the Belgorod region – all this prepares the offensive. Many of these operations never make it to the media.

What are the Ukrainians about?

They want to restore the situation at the beginning of the war on February 24, 2022, or cut off mainland Russia from Crimea. The Russians therefore spend a lot of energy on securing the peninsula with missiles, fortifications and anti-tank ditches. This also seems to me to be a remake of the Kursk battle in 1943. The stakes are huge.

Would a success of the offensive have consequences beyond territorial gains?

Yes, twice. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin would be forced to negotiate. He should ask himself whether he prefers to keep Crimea or whether he wants to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. If he loses the war, he will have to give up one of these goals. And I think he would prefer to keep Crimea and accept Ukraine’s NATO membership in return. This is how the Soviets, including Stalin, acted after World War II: they admitted Germany to NATO and accepted Austria’s sovereignty to keep the territory of the GDR.

And what happens if the offensive fails?

If it fails or does not happen at all, it will be extremely difficult for Kiev. Russia would continue to occupy one-sixth of Ukraine’s territory and would not have to sit at the negotiating table. The West would question whether they will continue to arm Ukraine. With consequences for the vote in the US, where elections will be held in November 2024.

… in which Moscow completely relies on Donald Trump.

Another victory for Donald Trump would change everything in Ukraine. Trump has no sympathy for Ukraine and sees no US interests at stake. That’s why he said he would solve the Ukraine problem in one day. That would amount to a dirty deal with Putin.

Would Trump not be receptive to the argument that by supporting Ukraine, the US is also sending a strong signal of its resolve to China?

That’s how Joe Biden sees it. Trump, on the other hand, never spoke about causation between Ukraine and Taiwan.

How do you rate the steadfastness of the Ukrainians?

That too will depend on this summer’s operations. The outcome of the Ukrainian offensive will determine the further course and outcome of the conflict in several respects. On a human and military level, it will be hard for the Ukrainians, very hard.

In your latest book on the lessons of war, you write that this war must end with victory for one side and defeat for the other. Is nothing in between possible?

The goals of the two sides are so contradictory that there is no other way: there must be a winner who achieves his war goals and a loser. Ukraine wants to regain territorial integrity, sovereignty and security. Russia’s war goal is imperial and colonial, as Putin just wants to absorb Ukraine and make it disappear. One side must win, the other must lose. That’s the difference between war and diplomacy.

Could Russia even accept defeat? You once told French President Emmanuel Macron that a lasting peace solution would remain impossible as long as Russia held on to the idea of ​​its empire and did not abandon it as Germany did.

Germany needed decades and thorough work to do this. Russia does not seem ready for this. This applies not only to Putin, but to the entire population manipulated by propaganda. Russia would find the farewell to imperial power more difficult than the imperial powers of the 19th century. And France also had big problems, as the Algerian war showed. Accepting the end of an empire is very complicated, very difficult. That is why today no one, including Macron, has any illusions about the possibility of a quick peace between Ukraine and Russia.

Moreover, wouldn’t China do everything it could to prevent a Russian defeat and thus the triumph of the Americans?

Not necessary. Of course, overthrowing Putinism and bringing democracy to Russia is not in China’s interest. But one should not forget: Chinese President Xi Jinping has not approved the annexation of Crimea. There is no alliance between China and Russia, only a partnership. Xi and Putin speak of “boundless friendship”. It’s not an alliance yet.

How is public opinion in Europe developing in relation to the war in Ukraine?

New York media are already seeing an erosion of US support and are talking about ‘war fatigue’. However, according to opinion polls, there is no change, not even in Europe. People know who the aggressor is and who was attacked. The economic consequences are not as bad as feared. I see the danger not so much in fatigue or wear and tear as in increasing indifference. The war seems further and further away. This is especially true in the US, where the upcoming elections will be of paramount importance to the course of the war.

You said that Europe must “commit to win”. What do you mean?

In addition to supplying fighter jets, it is also about increasing defense budgets. And this after the day when there is peace in Ukraine. What will Russia be doing in ten years’ time, what will China be doing in twenty years’ time? How will Turkey behave? Today, the understanding is returning that wars are part of the behavioral spectrum of individual states. We must face it: the period of peace after the Cold War is over.

Germany in particular needs to completely rethink not only its security policy, but also its energy policy. How do you see these efforts from Paris’ perspective?

Like all countries, Germany is also struggling with the realization that nothing will be the same before February 24, 2022. Hats off to Germany; because within a year they managed to stop importing gas and oil from Russia. Equally impressive is the German debate on China policy, including the question of the future of Volkswagen and Mercedes in the Chinese market. I am confident that the Germans will make the right decision. What I do not understand, however, is the German nuclear blockade. Germany is caught in a complete contradiction to the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Does the neutrality of Western countries such as Austria or Switzerland still fit into the Ukraine issue?

In the case of Switzerland, neutrality is a matter related to national identity. I think the Swiss Confederation is the only country where this is really the case. I know this because in the 1990s I took part in the work of Edouard Brunner’s ad hoc committee on the future of post-Cold War Swiss neutrality. I have had the opportunity to work on this issue with our Swiss friends and I know how delicate it is. I respect his boundaries. Switzerland has chosen to adapt its neutrality to the new circumstances. This succeeded in the Kosovo war with the overflight permit for aircraft from the Western coalition and the border troops sent there. Today, however, Switzerland is even reluctant to allow other countries to supply Swiss arms to Ukraine. I have a better understanding of Switzerland than many of my German colleagues, who usually have a better understanding of Austrian neutrality.

The shock waves of the war in Ukraine reach far beyond eastern Ukraine and even beyond Europe. The dominance of the ‘West’ is increasingly questioned. Are we seeing the beginning of a new world order?

The change is undeniable. A clear majority of countries in the UN still support Ukraine. Important countries such as Brazil, Vietnam and Turkey pursue their interests, but are not fundamentally opposed to the West. There are big problems in Africa because there is a story of colonization and Western imperialism. Europeans and Americans have made a grave mistake in leaving Africa to Russia’s diplomatic and military activities.