The Swiss secret service also monitors your data traffic, you should know that

The magazine ‘Republik’ published the start of an explosive series of articles on Tuesday. This revolves around the Swiss ‘surveillance state’.

Tech journalist Adrienne Fichter, who investigated the background of the federal government’s so-called ‘cable intelligence’, comes to a clear conclusion: it is de facto ‘a program for mass surveillance of the population living in Switzerland’.

Explosive: When voting on the new Intelligence Service Act (NDG), the Federal Council promised in 2016 that there would be no comprehensive surveillance. But this is exactly what happened, and those in charge at the federal government wanted to expand the reach.

How does cable intelligence work?

As Fichter explains, this is precisely the state mass surveillance that whistleblower Edward Snowden disclosed to the US secret service NSA in 2014 and which made headlines around the world: the automated monitoring of data traffic sent abroad (and back) via Swiss data centers ) is running.

From the point of view of the secret service agents, the procedure is understandable: it is in addition to the so-called radio reconnaissance, in which the signals transmitted via satellites are recorded and evaluated using our own listening stations.

During cable reconnaissance, the fiber optic cables are tapped directly in the data centers and the data flows that pass through them are scanned for suspicious objects.

The goals are obvious: “Collecting information, for example to combat espionage and terrorism, to protect national and security interests, but also to exchange information with friendly secret services.”

Whether email, instant message, video or Google search: if the monitoring system in the data center filters one of the predefined terms, the corresponding data is sent to the Swiss Army system Electronic Operations Center (ZOE) forwarded. This is located in the Bernese community of Zimmerwald.

Swisscom, Sunrise, Salt and Co. have no choice but to work together. Internet service providers must tolerate the installation and operation of government surveillance technology in their buildings. By law, they are also required to maintain absolute silence.

What exactly has the research into cable intelligence yielded?

According to ‘Republic’, Swiss authorities have repeatedly tried to allay public concerns about extensive monitoring of internet traffic during the 2016 voting campaign and beyond.

Mass surveillance like in other countries is not planned, said federal councilor Guy Parmelin, then head of the Ministry of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports (DDBS). And the voting book stated that comprehensive surveillance of all citizens was excluded. Former intelligence chief Markus Seiler echoed similar sentiments, claiming that cable information “is not used when two Swiss communicate via an email address controlled by a foreign provider.”

However, the investigation now shows that none of these promises have been kept, according to the ‘Republic’.

Where is the problem?

There are several.

1. Loss of confidence in authorities and democratic processes.

2. Lack of transparency = potential for abuse. Cable information is a black box, much of it is subject to secrecy. It would not be the first time that the federal government’s internal control and supervisory measures have failed.

3. Source protection is compromised. According to the “Republic” report, journalists “can no more technically guarantee the protection of sources than lawyers can guarantee attorney-client privilege.” The reason: The ZEO and its clients expressly do not protect these professional groups – and therefore their communications can be forwarded to the intelligence service.

NDB director Christian Dussey, who has been in office since 2022, has confirmed that the country’s security interests take priority over journalistic source protection – and this has therefore effectively been abolished.

4. The haystack dilemma. The NDB admitted to the Digital Society of Switzerland, an NGO that has been taking legal action against state surveillance for years, that the data sent to the ZEO for analysis is also stored there – “chats, emails and searches or simply very personal information “. This allows the Secret Service to conduct ‘retro searches’.

How does the covenant justify itself?

The Swiss secret service provided a detailed statement to “20 Minutes” and attempted to refute the accusation of mass surveillance.

The entire activities of the NDB are “constantly monitored and strictly controlled at various levels of government, parliament, administration and regulatory bodies”. And further: “These controls relate to the legality, appropriateness and effectiveness of the NDB’s activities.”

This includes the Independent Control Body for Radio and Cable Intelligence (UKI). This authority “regularly checks whether the search terms used and the results correspond to the approved and approved categories of search terms”.

It should be noted that the DDPS led by Federal Councilor Viola Amherd plans to revise the Intelligence Service Act again. According to ‘Republic’, this is intended to legalize what is already happening in practice.

Sources